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The peculiar practices 
of ‘authoritarian 
emigration states’
Gerasimos Tsourapas alerts us to how  
non-democratic states behave towards 
their own citizens living abroad.
A phenomenon on the rise
The attempted murder of Russian former 
military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal 
and his daughter in Salisbury on 4 March 
2018 brings to light an under-explored 
dimension of world politics, namely 
non-democracies’ outreach to citizens be-
yond their territorial borders. The work-
ings of authoritarian emigration states are 
not unknown to Western liberal democ-
racies – Russia under Vladimir Putin ap-
pears implicated not only in the case of 
the Skripal family, but also in the 2013 
death of political exile Boris Berezovsky, 
and the 2006 poisoning of former se-
cret service agent Alexander Litvinenko by radioactive 
polonium-210. In France and Belgium, Tunisian and 
Moroccan embassies have carefully monitored the ac-
tivities of their expatriate communities and report any 
suspicious activity to their governments back home 
since the 1960s. Other states’ engagement with em-
igration seems to fly under the radar but remains un-
doubtedly political: aiming to project a ‘Turkish Islam 
abroad’, Ankara now dispatches religious scholars via 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or the Dinayet, to 
some 2,000 mosques abroad each year. Since the 1959 
Cuban Revolution, Havana has offered paid opportuni-
ties for  its medical professionals – physicians, dentists, 
nurses – to work across Latin America, the Middle East, 
and sub-Saharan Africa. As authoritarian states devise 
new modes of projecting power abroad via emigration, 
two questions emerge: why do such practices appear to 
be part and parcel of everyday politics around the world, 
and how can we make sense of them?
Part of the answer to the rise of authoritarian emi-
gration states lies in the changes brought about by glo-
balisation. A range of forces contribute to the rise of 
cross-border mobility, from decreasing transportation 
costs to global economic interdependence or, merely, 
the pursuit of a better future beyond one’s own country. 
As the economies of democracies and non-democracies 
alike become more outward-facing, networks of people 
create connections across sending, transit, and host 
states. In this sense, authoritarian states attempt to reach 
out beyond their territorial borders just as democracies 
themselves do: many countries now offer state-sponsored 
celebrations or language lessons for expatriates’ families, 
while others have extended voting rights to citizens 
living abroad. Given the growing number of French cit-
izens living abroad, for instance, the French government 
has allowed expatriates to elect their own representatives 
to the National Assembly since 2010. In fact, partly as a 
result of global interconnectedness, a growing number 
of states develop institutions that specifically target their 
‘diasporas’ – a complex term that may refer to a state’s 
citizens abroad and their descendants, but also to broader 
groups of people that maintain a sense of connection to 
a homeland, be it real or imagined. 
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Contending with the ‘illiberal paradox’
Yet, globalisation only partly explains the rise of authori-
tarian emigration states. What has changed over time, is 
non-democracies’ attitude towards cross-border mobility, 
and the decision to embrace their citizens’ emigration as 
an asset rather than a liability. Historically, restricting 
emigration was the norm rather than the exception for 
the vast majority of authoritarian states that were eager 
to maintain full control over their citizens. The appre-
hension with which non-democracies approached em-
igration is best exemplified in the German Democratic 
Republic’s 1961 decision to construct the Berlin Wall, 
thereby putting an end to massive emigration and de-
fection into West Germany. Similar restrictions to cross-
border mobility existed across the Middle East, Africa, 
Eastern Europe, and Asia, as well as in Latin America. 
For much of the 20th century, Soviet citizens seeking to 
emigrate had to go through cumbersome processes to se-
cure an exit visa. The majority of applicants were refused 
such permission and were labelled as ‘refuseniks’, subject 
to constant harassment and varied forms of discrimina-
tion. In Cuba, simply talking about unauthorised travel 
abroad carried a six-month prison sentence until 2013. To 
grant freedom of movement to all citizens was a polit-
ical risk that authoritarian states were not willing to take. 
Even today, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
considers unauthorised emigration a form of defection 
and pursues a ‘shoot to kill’ policy for citizens attempting 
to cross its borders. Surviving would-be migrants face 
torture and forced labour in ‘re-education camps’.
Gradually, however, most authoritarian states came 
to realise that the political benefits of maintaining tight 
control over their citizens comes at a high price. Strict 
border controls constituted an increasingly costly pro-
cess that prevented access to the material benefits of 
emigration, including education and training oppor-
tunities abroad, the easing of unemployment pressures 
and, most immediately, access to migrants’ remittances 
in the form of money and care packages dispatched to 
family members left behind. Therein lies the illiberal 
paradox of authoritarian emigration states: on the one 
hand, non-democracies seek to restrict emigration for 
political and security reasons in order to suppress dissent 
and ensure control over their citizens’ lives as thoroughly 
as possible; on the other hand, they wish to encourage 
emigration for economic reasons in order to attract re-
mittances and other material benefits associated with 
cross-border mobility.
As many authoritarian states eased emigration con-
trols over the latter half of the 20th century, it seemed 
A ‘hazardous materials’ team prepares to investigate the home of assassination target Sergei Skripal. This incident  
in March 2018 represents an extreme example of how authoritarian emigration states deal with their citizens who live abroad.  
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Ten years after 
the nationalisation 
of Northern Rock
John Kay reminds us of how the financial  
crisis unfolded 10 years ago.
On 22 February 2008, the British gov-
ernment nationalised Northern Rock, 
a  mortgage lender which a few years 
earlier had taken advantage of deregula-
tion to transform its status from building 
society to bank. Northern Rock was an 
early victim of the global financial crisis 
which began in August 2007 with the 
failure of some hedge funds sponsored 
by the French bank Société Générale. 
A run on Northern Rock took place the 
following month – the queues formed 
outside  branches as savers hoped to 
recover their money while there was still 
some left, a  run which was only stopped 
when the government stepped in to 
guarantee deposits.
Northern Rock’s principal problem
Northern Rock’s principal problem, oddly enough, was 
not the poor quality of its lending, although the bank had 
been aggressive in promoting mortgages to people with 
little or no money of their own to contribute to the 
purchase. The issue was that the bank’s funding strategy 
involved packaging mortgages to sell on to other banks 
– a process known as securitisation. When buyers be-
latedly became sceptical about the value of such 
securities, especially those based on subprime mortgages 
in  the United States, the securitisation market simply 
dried up, and Northern Rock was unable to refinance 
its operations.
The financial crisis deepens
The crisis deepened throughout 2008, culminating in 
September with the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros, and 
the failure of other US financial institutions. In October, 
the British government rescued HBOS and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, two of Britain’s five major banks.
The fundamental problem was that banks have be-
come wide-ranging financial conglomerates, using 
their  retail deposit base, effectively guaranteed by gov-
ernments, as collateral for a wide range of trading activi-
ties. When, as at Northern Rock, these trading activities 
were unsuccessful, the day-to-day operation of the pay-
ment system on which economic and social life depends 
was jeopardised.
Policy responses to the financial crisis
The policy response to the events of 2008 has three main 
components. The most obvious, though hotly contested, 
remedy is to separate retail banking from other finan-
cial activities. In 1933 Congress passed the Glass Steagall 
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that economic needs had marginalised any political 
concerns: from the 1970s onwards, oil-rich countries in 
the Middle East – such as Libya and Saudi Arabia – 
started encouraging student emigration to Western Eu-
rope and North America. There was a distinct material 
rationale behind this, as governments were hoping that 
such forms of mobility would lead to the development of 
a local, educated elite. Poorer Arab states, such as Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Morocco lifted all restrictions to emigration 
in the hope of increasing the influx of capital inflows via 
remittances, as millions of workers flocked to Europe 
and the Gulf states. In the People’s Republic of China, 
Deng Xiaoping’s espousal of economic liberalisation in 
the 1970s led to the embrace of labour emigration as part 
and parcel of the state’s developmental strategy. In Eu-
rope, Turkish workers profited from labour agreements 
between Ankara and various European states to resettle 
in West Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere as 
guest workers, or ‘Gastarbeiter’, until the early 1970s.
Projecting authoritarianism abroad: 
hard and soft power dynamics
Did the liberalisation of emigration contribute to the 
weakening of non-democratic rule? Not quite. Author-
itarian emigration states resolved the illiberal paradox 
not by abandoning their goal of political control, but by 
developing complex forms of transnational authoritari-
anism. One type of transnational authoritarianism is the 
use of aggression, or hard power, towards a state’s mi-
grant and diaspora communities: targeted assassinations 
of Russian political defectors abroad, for instance, is one 
such example. In September 2017, the murder of Syrian 
opposition activist Orouba Barakat and her journalist 
daughter in Istanbul was attributed to the long arm of 
the Assad regime. Under the rule of Colonel Gaddafi in 
Libya, a political envoy in London named Musa Kusa 
was tasked with identifying and eliminating Libyan op-
position figures in the United Kingdom – Kusa’s zeal 
earned him the nickname mab’ūth al-mawt (‘the envoy 
of death’). Such forms of projecting hard power abroad, 
or what academic Dana Moss terms ‘transnational re-
pression’, also include the surveillance of migrants’ ac-
tivity abroad, forced extradition requests or, in more 
extreme cases, migrants’ de-nationalisation: Tunisia has, 
at multiple times over the years, stripped political dis-
senters – particularly members of the Islamist Ennahda 
Movement – of their citizenship while abroad, barring 
them from returning to the country. Often, therefore, an 
authoritarian state does not relinquish control over their 
citizens’ lives once they have emigrated; it merely revises 
the ways it exerts power over them.
But transnational authoritarianism does not neces-
sarily involve acts of aggression or violence, for it may 
also attempt to use migrant communities as an instru-
ment of co-optation or, according to Joseph Nye’s term, 
‘soft power’. The rise of China as a global power cannot 
be disassociated from ‘wenhua ruan shili’, or the cultural 
soft power it pursues in a number of ways, including 
the dispatch of Chinese teachers to over 500 Confucius 
Institutes across the world. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba’s 
‘medical internationalism’ project tasked medical profes-
sionals with carrying the torch of the revolution in other 
parts of the Global South. In the Middle East, Egyp-
tian President Gamal Abdel Nasser developed an exten-
sive programme of dispatching thousands of Egyptian 
teachers across the Arab world, aiming to spread ideas 
of anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism, and Arab unity. More 
recently, the Iranian-Saudi competition over regional 
hegemony also includes a transnational dimension of ef-
forts at exerting religious influence beyond the two states’ 
borders, in a manner reminiscent of Turkey’s ongoing 
Dinayet practices. These practices suggest a less harsh 
type of transnational authoritarianism: in addition to ex-
tending control over potential political dissenters beyond 
their territorial borders, authoritarian emigration states 
employ loyal subjects abroad for soft power purposes.
Authoritarian power beyond state borders
What will the impact of authoritarian emigration states 
be in the future? The attempted assassination of Sergei 
Skripal in March 2018 has highlighted the extent to 
which the rise of international migration has affected 
the workings of authoritarianism in world politics. But 
beyond a novel set of practices aimed at the projection 
of hard and soft power abroad, we can see how author-
itarian emigration states are learning from each other’s 
practices as they continue to develop novel forms of 
projecting power beyond their borders. In fact, a degree 
of policy diffusion is evident. Russian strategies aimed 
at deterring dissent in the diaspora appear to expand 
upon mechanisms that have already been employed by 
the Libyan state in the past. And, beyond the use of co-
ercion, Chinese soft power strategies abroad build on 
lessons learned from similar practices by Egyptian and 
Cuban elites. 
At the same time, a rising question remains unan-
swered, namely how should liberal democratic states and 
their citizens respond to the peculiar practices of author-
itarian emigration states? Do liberal democracies choose 
tight border controls and embrace illiberal policies – as 
when the Netherlands barred Turkish ministers from 
speaking at political rallies in Rotterdam in March 2017? 
Others have suggested that liberal democracies need to 
re-evaluate their foreign policy – in Britain, some de-
mand an examination of our relationship with Moscow, 
as they had also done with regard to London’s ties with 
the Gaddafi regime in the past. Regardless of immediate 
policy responses, the emergence and empowerment of 
authoritarian emigration states contributes to new forms 
of everyday politics around the world that we are only 
now beginning to comprehend. 
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